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1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades or so, China has demonstrated a 
strong desire to be involved in the global trading system and has 
established a sound legal framework for intellectual property 
rights (“IPR”) protection.  An extensive theoretical literature has 
examined the impact of the global IPR protection framework on 
Chinese IPR legislation and the stepped-up efforts China has 
endeavored to make in bringing its domestic laws into conformity 
with its World Trade Organization (“WTO”) commitments.  Now 
it is generally accepted that the gap between the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”) 
and China’s intellectual property laws has been greatly narrowed.1 
While “China has implemented its WTO obligations on time, 
and in some cases ahead of schedule,”2 the testing of empirical 
 
1 See, e.g., Robert Bejesky, Investing in the Dragon: Managing the Patent Versus 
Trade Secret Protection Decision for the Multinational Corporation in China, 11 TULSA J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 437, 487 (2004) (discussing that “China has eagerly consummated 
international treaties and has adopted strong domestic [intellectual property 
legislation] . . . to attract technological innovations”); Warren Newberry, Copyright 
Reform in China: A “TRIPs” Much Shorter and Less Strange Than Imagined?, 35 CONN. 
L. REV. 1425, 1446 (2003) (concluding that “reforms brought China’s copyright 
regime into compliance with the TRIPs Agreement and the Berne Convention”). 
Some commentators have given even more optimistic appraisals, asserting that 
China’s intellectual property laws have approached an advanced level in the 
world. 
2  EUROPEAN UNION CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN CHINA, EUROPEAN BUSINESS IN 
CHINA POSITION PAPER (2005). 
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evidence as to effectiveness of enforcement has been little-
explored.  A broad consensus is developing that it is the 
enforcement rather than legislation that prevents China from 
fulfilling its TRIPs obligations.  Attempts have thus been made to 
examine the stubborn enforcement problems in China;3 however, 
there is little work of significance addressing the multifaceted 
issues related to IPRs enforcement with a more incentive-based 
explanation than merely applying a cultural approach.  Moreover, 
strategic solutions to the existing enforcement problems have been 
little explored. 
This Article seeks to capture the significance and dilemmas 
associated with IPR protection in China and to demystify the the 
enforcement problems.  Section 2 assesses shortcomings of the IPR 
enforcement regime and sheds new light on enforcement problems 
by exploring and explicating various obstacles associated with IPR 
enforcement.  It argues that China’s cultural uniqueness, 
institutional impediments and economic insufficiency formed 
knotty points of the enforcement deficiency.  Apart from the 
common reason of insufficient economic development, the IPR 
enforcement problem in China is a unique political phenomenon 
resulting from the systemic dystrophy fundamental to Chinese 
institutional development.  The goal of IPR enforcement in China is 
thus achieved, in a great measure, through political advocacy 
rather than a legal process.  In this scenario, the West should find 
ways to identify real problems and resolve specific difficulties 
without merely displacing their Chinese counterparts elsewhere.  
Having identified issues of enforcement difficulties, Section 3 
summarizes a four-stage approach to mitigating the counterfeiting 
menace and undoing the Gordian Knot.  The four-stage approach 
suggests that the West should try to foster and facilitate shifts of 
China to initiate a virtuous circle of improved IPR protection. 
2. ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS:  A PRISMATIC LENS 
Technically, upon the WTO accession, Chinese intellectual 
property laws as a whole are adequate for the prevention of the 
IPR infringement.  However, as shown in the United States Trade 
 
3 See, e.g., Geoffrey T. Willard, An Examination of China’s Emerging Intellectual 
Property Regime: Historical Underpinnings, The Current System and Prospects for the 
Future, 6 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 435 (1996) (stating that “China’s 
intellectual property laws are now among the world’s most comprehensive and 
modern”). 
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Representative Annual Report, the problem of counterfeiting and 
piracy in China remains out of control.4  As a consequence, 
“Washington’s warnings against Chinese piracy of films, music, 
software, medicine and machines have become a diplomatic 
mantra.”5  At present, China is still considered to be one of the 
world’s largest exporters of fake goods.6  Much has been done in 
an effort to eradicate the problem, but the counterfeiting and 
piracy seem to have become a persistent ailment and a perennial 
conundrum.  The sticking point is clear:  laws without enforcement 
are wasted paper, as are rights without remedy.7  No panacea for 
counterfeiting and piracy is available.  China will have no option 
but to gear up to fulfill its international obligations, and it is to the 
related difficulties to which we now turn. 
2.1. A Square Peg for a Round Hole:  Individual Rights Advocacy 
Under Collectivist Ideology 
In stark contrast to a liberal notion of individual rights in the 
Western sense, Communism, the unprecedented socialist 
experiment advocating equality and liberty in the twentieth 
century,8 substantially influenced cultural perceptions and 
reshaped moral landscape in modern China.9  As China expert Dr. 
Robert Weatherley has pointed out, Karl Marx deemed the 
individual as a “species being” who exists as an intrinsic part of the 
society to which he or she was born.10  Upon the establishment of 
 
4 See UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2005 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON 
CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 3–5 (2005) , available at  http://www.ustr.gov 
/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2005/asset_upload_file293_85
80.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2008) (outlining China’s legal obligations to the WTO 
and their shortfalls with regard to such obligations). 
5 Chris Buckley, On Piracy, an Advocate for China’s Progress, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Oct. 4, 2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/10/04/business 
/IPRjudge.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2006). 
6 Robert Marquand, China’s Pirate Industry Thriving, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Jan. 9, 2002, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0109/p6s1-wosc.html 
(last visited Nov. 23, 2008). 
7 Willard, supra note 3, at 435. 
8 See A DICTIONARY OF MARXIST THOUGHT 102–05 (Tom Bottomore ed., 1983) 
(providing a definition for communism). 
9 See Brigitte Binkert, Why the Current Global Intellectual Property Framework 
under TRIPS is Not Working, 10 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 143 (2006) (arguing that 
current perceptions of intellectual property in China lag behind those in the 
Western world). 
10 ROBERT WEATHERLEY, THE DISCOURSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA: 
HISTORICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 93, 104 (1999) (examining the 
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the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) in 1949, the central 
government repealed the entire corpus the of existing legal regime 
and transplanted a new legal system based on the Soviet model.11  
While IPR is an outcome of a market economy, Marxism-Leninism 
provides a basis for a theory that “private capital is a means to 
exploitation.”12  As a consequence of the ideological predisposition, 
the philosophy of sharing wealth became the dominant force in 
shaping modern Chinese identity, and the IPR regime was deeply 
embedded in the notion that individual rights are most readily 
defended as effective means to state ends.13  Accordingly, China’s 
IPR protection regime was built upon the foundation that sustains 
“the balance between collectivist and individualist thought,”14 and 
the “harmony of interests . . . between the individual and the 
state.”15  Since collective dominance has outweighed the interests 
of individual rights for decades,16 for the sake of maintaining a 
stable and harmonious community, citizens are strongly promoted 
to consciously—and sometimes unconditionally—relinquish any 
rights in favor of the society.17  It is not surprising that collectivist 
ideology is apt to erode the foundation upon which IPR as a form 
of individual right is built.18 
As a logical consequence transplanting IPR regime in China 
amounts to fitting a square peg in a round hole, making it “more of 
a wish list for foreign investors than a realistic and effective 
system” of global enforcement for IPR, despite the fact that China’s 
economic reforms have been impressive.19  Although the law has 
 
relationship between individual rights and the superiority of collective interests, 
and harmony of interests under the Marxist ideology). 
11 Willard, supra note 3, at 417. 
12 Brent T. Yonehara, Enter the Dragon: China’s WTO Accession, Film Piracy and 
Prospects for Enforcement of Copyright Laws, 12 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 63, 79–
80 (2002). 
13 WEATHERLEY, supra note 10, at 128–31. 
14 Bejesky, supra note 1, at 446. 
15 WEATHERLEY, supra note 10, at 49. 
16 See Randall P. Peerenboom, Rights, Interests, and the Interest in Rights in 
China, 31 STAN. J. INT’L L. 359, 367 (1995) (“In the dominant western conception, 
individual rights precede interests and the balancing process. In contrast, the 
Chinese conception of rights as interests to be balanced more readily lends itself to 
the view that rights are . . . granted by the authorities”). 
17 WEATHERLEY, supra note 10, at 105–07. 
18 Bejesky, supra note 1, at 447. 
19 See Scott J. Palmer, An Identity Crisis: Regime Legitimacy and the Politics of 
Intellectual Property Rights in China, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 449, 450 (2001) 
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been introduced and implemented, there is an inertial way of 
thinking among some of China’s leaders to view IPR as a major 
barrier in obtaining modern technologies necessary for continued 
economic development.20  Indeed, it is still an influential discourse 
in China that in accepting reluctantly the incompatible obligations 
for the protection of foreign IPR, China, together with other 
developing countries, are vulnerable to being exploited.21  
Ironically, while China is depicted by the American critics as a 
“land of unethical pirates,” in the eyes of some Chinese, the United 
States appears as a “land of money-grubbing monopolists.”22 
In addition, China’s perception towards IPR has been 
influenced by inherent nationalist sentiments.23  To a great extent, 
this nationalist sentiment was an actual reaction to the long-
standing indignities and “humiliation that China suffered under 
the hands of Western imperialism,”24 particularly after China’s 
decisive defeat in the Opium Wars which commenced in the mid-
nineteenth century.25  It is much more apparent when it comes to 
the distinction and interaction between what is foreign and what is 
 
(arguing that China’s intellectual property regime lacks the social infrastructure to 
support it). 
20 See Andrew J. McCall, Copyright and Trademark Enforcement in China, 9 
TRANSNAT’L LAW. 587, 593–603 (1996) (describing the initiatives taken by the 
United States Trade Representative to engage the Chinese government in IPR). 
21 See id. at 593-94 (claiming that the developing nations view the importation 
of intellectual property as a means of the developed nations to dominate and 
explore the developing world); see also Julia Cheng, China’s Copyright System: 
Rising to the Spirit of TRIPs Requires an Internal Focus and WTO Membership, 21 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1941, 1982 (1998) (discussing that “China shares economic 
disincentives to the vigorous enforcement of intellectual property rights with 
many other developing countries”). 
22 Alexander C. Chen, Climbing the Great Wall:  A Guide to Intellectual Property 
Enforcement in the People’s Republic of China, 25 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 8 (1997). 
23 See Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use 
Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L L. 
J. 1, 25–27 (2001) (discussing the source of Chinese frustration with IPR). 
24 Id. at 25 (citation omitted). 
25 The Opium Wars, also known as the First Anglo-Chinese War, took place 
between Great Britain and the Chinese Qing Empire from 1839 to 1842 with the 
aim of protecting British opium trade in China. The Anglo-Chinese War initiated a 
long history of Chinese political and social chaos and their antipathy to European 
imperial hegemony that arguably still has remnants. See CHINA: A HISTORICAL AND 
CULTURAL DICTIONARY 237–38 (Michael Dillon ed., 1998) (providing a brief 
summary and timeline of the Opium Wars). See also, YONGNIAN ZHENG, 
DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM IN CHINA: MODERNIZATION, IDENTITY, AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 154 (1999) (illustrating the role in which the Opium 
Wars played in defining modern Chinese nationalism). 
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domestic, in a state that had long been isolated from the outside 
world.  Fuelled by socio-economic torment and nationalist 
sentiments, Chinese instinctively vented their grievances on 
foreign enterprises.26 The most recent example was the large 
protests boycotting Carrefour, the French retail group, following 
the interrupted Olympic torch relay in Paris in the mid-April 
2008.27 
It rings true that, in China, the principle of intellectual property 
contravenes the fundamental ideals upon which collectivist society 
is built, and the protection towards foreign proprietors tends to 
arouse nationalist sentiments.  Not surprisingly, implementation of 
IPR is undertaken with reluctance.  Although China has integrated 
rapidly into the world economy upon obtaining its WTO 
membership, public ownership holds steady and China remains a 
Communist country in terms of constitutional ideology.28  These 
deeply ingrained notions have not been rooted out entirely and 
still, consciously or unconsciously, influence comprehension and 
perception of intellectual property rights in China. 
2.2. Lord Ye’s Fondness of Dragons:  Economic Prosperity and 
Democratic Hysteresis 
More than two thousand years ago in ancient China, a county 
magistrate in Chu Kingdom was called the Lord Ye (Ye Gong) who 
was reputed widely as a great lover of dragons.29  The Lord Ye was 
so fascinated with dragons that the dragons were painted or 
 
26 See Yu, supra note 23, at 23–24 (discussing the consequences of the Chinese 
worldview). 
27 Ji Shaoting & Li Jianmin, Protests Erupt at Carrefour Outlets in China, China 
View, May 1, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-05/01/content 
_8085889.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2008). 
28 See XIAN FA [People’s Republic of China Constitution], art. 6, (1982) (P.R.C) 
(“[t]he basis of the socialist economic system of the People’s Republic of China is 
socialist public ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the 
whole people and collective ownership by the working people. The system of 
socialist public ownership supersedes the system of exploitation of man by man; it 
applies the principle of ‘from each according to his ability, to each according to his 
work.”  During the primary stage of socialism, the State adheres to the basic 
economic system with the public ownership remaining dominant and diverse 
sectors of the economy developing side by side, and to the distribution system 
with the distribution according to work remaining dominant and the coexistence 
of a variety of modes of distribution.”). 
29 See XIAO MIN, JINGDIAN CHENGYU GUSHI 1: YE GONG HAO LONG [CLASSICAL 
CHINESE IDIOMS 1: LORD YE’S FONDNESS OF DRAGONS] 1–156 (2001). 
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carved on his walls, pillars, beams, furniture, window lattices, and 
ceilings.30  In addition, all his robes and bed nets were embroidered 
with different images of dragons.31  The real dragon in heaven 
heard of his infatuation and, on a stormy night, descended to earth 
and paid him a visit.32  The dragon glided down to Lord Ye’s 
house, poked its head into the window, leaving its long tail out in 
the yard. At this sight, the Lord Ye was scared out of his wits and 
fled in panic.33  This story shows that Lord Ye was not genuinely 
fond of dragons but merely images of dragons—he professed love 
of what he actually feared (ye gong hao long). 
It so happens in modern China that the national leaders are in 
just such an ambivalent and self-contradictory position in terms of 
China’s political transition.34  While many critics have linked 
economic changes to greater political freedom in China,35 the 
reality is that China is currently standing at an ideological, social, 
and political crossroads: the intersection of a splendid economic 
landscape marred by lagging political reform.36 Like two lines 
askew, China’s economic and political infrastructures are 
contrastingly divergent.  Alleging to carve their own niche in their 
institutional reform, Chinese leaders routinely insist that Western 
democracy is not a panacea for China’s unique problems.  The 
assumption that the spread of Beatles music and Mercedes Benz 
cars throughout China is a token of the triumph of Western 
democracy is elusive.37 
 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 See Wei-Wei Zhang, China’s Political Transition: Trends and Prospects, 
EURASIA BULLETIN (2003), at 11–14 (discussing China’s recent attempts to reform 
the economy without reforming the political system and the problems caused by 
such an attempt). 
35 John R. Allison & Lianlian Lin, The Evolution of Chinese Attitudes Toward 
Property Rights in  Invention and Discovery, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 735, 774 
(1999). 
36 See Zhang, supra note 34, at 11 (asserting that Chinese economic reform 
may better be described as “great economic reform with lesser political reform”). 
37 See id. at 12–13 (warning of the differences between economic and political 
change); see also Randall P. Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One 
Hundred Schools Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 536 
(2002) (noting that there are differences in fundamental values between Western 
democracies and Asian countries). 
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On one hand, Chinese leadership maintains that the Western 
style of democracy is not suitable for the fundamental realities 
(guoqing) of China.38  Political reform has thus been characterized 
by incrementalism and progress made only by the trial and error 
method.39  Despite pious declarations of good intentions about 
political reform, the process of democratization seems to have 
stagnated.40  Democracy remains the rhetoric of the political elites, 
and those challenging the authoritarian system and competing the 
party’s dictatorship continue to draw fire against themselves. 
On the other hand, however, there has been growing 
awareness and concerns that the ongoing economic reform may 
have released a Pandora’s Box of unintended consequences.41  This 
dilemma has made Chinese leaders solicitous in initiating 
substantial political reform.  Although the principle of democracy 
has been incorporated into the Constitution of the P.R.C., China is 
fond of democracy in the way of Lord Ye:  China accepts the fame 
of democracy but hesitates to embrace its spirit.  As a result, 
despite the ostentatious self-labeling as a socialist “rule of law” 
state,42  without endorsing the spirit of liberal democracy, the “rule 
of law” in China unsurprisingly remains symbolic and 
problematic. 
Over the past decades since the “door” was opened, the 
enormous transformation of the political, social and economic 
landscape has fundamentally reshaped the moral standards of 
Chinese citizens.43  As a consequence of the mere economic 
reforms, individual aspirations of the citizens are fostered and 
fulfilled without a corresponding regulatory system.  Against the 
backdrop of economic transition, Chinese leaders have found 
 
38 INFORMATION OFFICE OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF 
CHINA, BUILDING OF POLITICAL DEMOCRACY IN CHINA § I (Oct. 19, 2005), available at 
http://english.people.com.cn/whitepaper/democracy/democracy(1).html. 
39 Id. § VI; see also ZHENG, supra note 25, at 1160-61. 
40 See Xianglin Xu, Yi Zhengzhi Wending Wei Jichu de Zhongguo Jianjin Gaige 
[China’s Political Reform is Preoccupied by Incrementalism], 5 STRATEGY & MGMT. 1 
(2000) (arguing that China’s slow progress on social issues can only be expedited 
with political reform). 
41 Zhang, supra note 34,  at 12. 
42 See XIAN FA art. 5 (1982) (P.R.C) (stating that the People’s Republic of China 
is building a socialist rule of law system). 
43 See HARRY HARDING, POLITICAL REFORM IN PACIFIC CENTURY:   THE 
EMERGENCE OF MODERN PACIFIC ASIA 403 (1992) (describing the political, social, 
and economic changes in post-Mao China). 
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themselves in a great quandary and have to confront the grievous 
crises brought about by rapid yet unbalanced economic 
development.44 
Due to the precaution of the government in bringing its 
political evolution into line with its economic prosperity, the 
Chinese central authority runs the risk of precipitating social 
turmoil and upheaval.45  The cascading societal and political 
problems have, in many circumstances, frustrated the efforts of 
ordinary Chinese citizens to earn their living through normal 
channels.46  In order to survive the upheaval, people have to 
contemplate every possible approach they deem workable.  As 
China scholar Stanley Lubman has stated, “[r]elations among 
Chinese are changing, as new networks of personal relationships 
appear as [a] means of getting things done.” 47  The shift is 
exacerbated by the weakness of ethical constraints and the shared 
personal standards that might otherwise have provided a 
normative framework for interpersonal communications and 
commercial transactions.  Ironically, the money fetishism48 that 
Karl Marx criticized over a century ago may now have been 
substantiated and venerated as a recognized credo of many people 
who are, or used to be, his faithful disciples. 
As a consequence of the unbalanced reform, traditional values 
have been eroded and replaced dramatically by utilitarianism, 
which found fertilization in a set of socio-economic conflicts 
deriving from the dysfunctional institutional evolution.  The 
peculiar utilitarianism gives rise to moral decline, eroding 
 
44 See generally, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, MUDDLING TOWARD DEMOCRACY: 
POLITICAL CHANGE IN GRASSROOTS CHINA (2008), prepared by Anne F. Thurston, 
available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/thurst23/thurst23.html 
(describing China’s recent development challenges). 
45  See Zhang, supra note 34, at 12 (mentioning potential social unrest as a 
result of early rapid reforms). 
46 See Martin King Whyte, Chinese Popular Views about Inequality, The 
Woodrow Wilson Ctr. Asia Program Special Report no. 104, 5 (2002), available at 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/asiarpt_104.pdf (describing the 
situation of laid-off workers of state-owned enterprises). 
47 Stanley Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty Years, 20 
NW J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383, 404 (2000). 
48 See KARL MARX, KAPITAL 31–37 (Friedrich Engels ed., 1952) (showing that 
money fetishism attributes powers to an alien force that dominates social affairs.  
It is the illusion that money has its own productive powers, particularly in 
politics, and is fetishized to the extent that its power to solve problems is 
considered as inherently natural, believing that money is a “radical leveller” 
invading all spheres of social life). 
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traditional bases for social cohesion and undermining ethical 
foundation sustaining IPR protection. 
All these issues call for a more sophisticated and accountable 
government and demand a more liberalized political sphere, which 
would be a systematic and strategic approach to tackling some of 
the new inequalities than such periodic outbursts of rioting and 
demonstrations.49  However, many commentators remain less 
optimistic about China’s commitment to adhering to the notion of 
liberalization and the rule of law.50  The only practical way to 
influence the process of democratization in China is to work 
cooperatively and closely with the central government, but even 
here the consequences remain uncertain. 
Apart from the cascading societal and political problems that 
have reshaped the philosophical thinking of Chinese citizens, 
China’s rigid authorities over the functioning of religion contribute 
to the sprouting and growing of utilitarian impulse and 
subsequently hinder its ability to establish an effective enforcement 
mechanism.  The father of modern international law, Hugo 
Grotius, asserted that, in the same sense that international law 
maintains religious toleration, religious toleration sustains a stable 
international order.51  Freedom of religion is considered by many 
to be a fundamental human right.52  As an entrenched international 
 
49 Anthony Saich, Beijing’s Balancing Act on Reform, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2002 
(mentioning that substantive political reform would strengthen the legitimacy of 
party rule, and a “more democratic system would provide a residual legitimacy 
that might help the regime to negotiate the difficult transition ahead.”). 
50 Indeed, over the past years, flurries of expectant hopes have been 
repeatedly dashed by the eventual resurgence of conservative forces, raising a 
perennial question:   how could China be able to continue transforming itself into 
a more liberalized and democratic country? See Karen Halverson, China’s WTO 
Accession:  Economic, Legal and Political Implications, 27 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 
319, 363–65 (2004) (demonstrating the intractability and inflexibility of China’s 
political reform). 
51 Myres S. McDougal et al., The Right to Religious Freedom and World Public 
Order: The Emerging Norm of Nondiscrimination, 74 MICH. L. REV. 865, 879 (1976) 
(echoing the sentiments of Grotius that “[t]he trends toward religious freedom 
and equality within national communities have. . .have brought about 
transnational expectations of religious liberty that, in turn, have strengthened 
national practice. Building upon the doctrine of natural rights as a source of 
transnational authority, Hugo Grotius (and other prominent international lawyers 
after him) emphasized that, in the same sense that international law is important 
to the maintenance of religious toleration, is religious toleration indispensable to a 
stable international order.”). 
52 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted and proclaimed by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948, at the Palais 
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human right, it is recognized in all the important international 
human rights treaties and remains the focus of debate in a variety 
of international human rights bodies.53  While the Chinese 
Constitution explicitly guarantees a citizens right to “freely choose 
and express their religious beliefs“ and make clear their religious 
affiliations,54 the Chinese government has demonstrated a 
continued reluctance to be flexible in its religious policies and 
provide a minimum guarantee for religious freedom.  Dominated 
by socialist atheism, religion in China is commonly viewed as a 
 
de Chaillot in Paris, France, defines freedom of religion and belief as follows: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief 
in teaching, practice, worship, and observance.” See Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), ¶18, U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) 
(outlining the basic principles of the modern human rights regime).  
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a U.N. treaty based 
on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights created in 1966, expands its prior 
statement to address the manifestation of religion or belief. Article 18 of this 
Covenant includes four paragraphs relating to religious belief: 
1) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion 
or belief of his  choice, and freedom, either individually or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching, 2) No 
one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to 
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, 3) Freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public 
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms 
of others, 4) The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to 
have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal 
guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children 
in conformity with their own convictions. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 18 G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368. 
53 See LEONARD M. HAMMER, A FOUCAULDIAN APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: DESCRIPTIVE THOUGHTS FOR NORMATIVE ISSUES 73 (2007) (discussing the 
freedom of religion). 
54 Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution stipulates that “Citizens of the 
People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, 
public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not believe 
in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do 
not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one 
may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair 
the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state. 
Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.” 
XIAN FA art. 36 (1982) (P.R.C). 
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perpetuation of feudal superstitions and has been somewhat 
monsterized.55  The tight control over religious practice has 
isolated Chinese religious believers from the rest of the religious 
world, which in turn largely accounts for the lack of ethical belief 
among a large percentage of the population, particularly the 
younger generation, both in the rural and urban regions.  As a 
result, a large percentage of the population, particularly the youth, 
lacks religious beliefs and the ethical support that those beliefs 
provide.  In the meantime, with the disintegration of Communism 
as a means of meeting social aspirations, there are few adherents of 
Marxism, resulting in a situation where China has entered upon a 
period of a “belief vacuum.“ 
The freedom of religious belief is a universal and essential 
human right.  Although religion and law are usually viewed as 
two elements of moral values with distinct social identities, in 
reality, religious faith and legal order inevitably interact.56 Of 
course while it is too arrogant to assert that morality would be 
impossible without religious belief, it may be true that, under 
religious principles, individuals are more inclined to adhere to an 
ethical code and bind themselves by social, legal or moral ties.  The 
imposition of law by its own force or momentum is tenuous. 
Without religious belief and faith, there would be no developed 
multidimensional systems to provide a firm foundation to enable 
an enduring belief in law and, as such, no self-disciplining 
consciousness to constrain counterfeiting and piracy. 
Another generic reason for the observed instability is the 
government’s inability to safeguard the freedom of speech.  
Freedom of speech is a fundamental personal liberty, and is 
regarded as one of society’s most cherished rights.57  However, 
while China has undergone dramatic economic and social changes, 
the central government has endeavored to maintain strict control 
 
55 See CONGREGATIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, ANNUAL REPORT 
16-20 (2002), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt 
/2002annRptEng.pdf. 
56 See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER:  THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW 
AND RELIGION 209-20 (1993) (describing the linkage between religion and legal 
order). 
57 See Symposium, Achieving A Workable Definition of Free Speech:  A 
Symposium on the Nature and Scope of the Constitutional Guarantee of Freedom of 
Expression, 47 J. URB. L. 395, 396 (1969) (mentioning that freedom of speech is 
essential to democracy). 
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over the media.58  China adopts an extensive licensing system to 
monitor publication of news and opinions on matters of public 
concern, and the authorities place severe restriction on imported 
movies, books, and audiovisual products.59  Chinese mass media, 
which is criticized as the mouthpiece (houshe) of the Party, has been 
squeezed into the mission of issuing propaganda.60  A recent 
example is the proposed national emergency law which has drawn 
a great deal of attention in China since June 2006.61  This proposed 
law, which has the alleged objective of enhancing disaster 
responsiveness and ensuring administrative responsibility,62 
includes a media clause that would impose heavy fines on news 
media reporting without authorization on natural disasters, public 
health incidents or industrial accidents.63  A major controversy was 
stirred up over this media clause of the emergency law, 
particularly for those approaching this issue from the standpoint of 
liberal press theory.  Apart from traditional media, the government 
has a longstanding set of policies restricting information and has 
particularly attempted to implement controls to prevent the 
public’s access to politically sensitive information by the 
mandatory use of internet filtering technology.64 
 
58 See CONGREGATIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA, supra note 55, at 
32–33 (demonstrating that although people in China are generally free to express 
their discontent with their government, anyone wishing to publish sensitive 
information or ideas may face legal and economic barriers). 
59 For a precise discussion of the rules and regulations of information control 
policy in China, see Anna S. F. Lee, The Censorship and Approval Process for Media 
Products in China, in PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA 127 
(1997); Mary L. Riley, The Regulation of the Media in China, in CHINESE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: LAW AND PRACTICE 355 (Mark A. Cohen et al eds. 1999); Yu, supra note 
23, at 28-32. 
60 See id., at 29 (noting that the media is among the most heavily regulated 
industries in China). 
61 See Emergency response law “will ensure accurate info”, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, 
July 4, 2006, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-07/04 
/content_4790522.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2008). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. (reporting that Article 57 stipulates that “News media violating certain 
rules to report the development and handling of emergencies without 
authorization,  or releasing fraudulent reports, will be fined between 50,000 yuan 
(U.S. $6,250) and 100,000 yuan if the reports lead to serious consequences.”). 
64 See Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Hard Law School Empirical 
Analysis of Internet Filtering in China, available at http://cyber.law.harvard 
.edu/filtering/china. 
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In China, “freedom of speech“ is a de jure right prescribed by 
the Constitution.65 However, it is not de facto an inherent individual 
liberty, but rather a hypocritical vehicle for citizens to sing a 
collective song of praise.  Many Chinese are vulnerable to publish 
information that authorities might deem sensitive. 66  As a result, 
“coin it in silence“ (men sheng fa da cai), which means making 
fortunes quietly without being associated with politics, has been 
embraced as a motto by many Chinese.  In this circumstance, 
unless genuine effort is being taken by the government, it would 
be naturally assumed that people are well positioned to reap the 
benefits of piracy as a means of “making fortunes quietly.” 
2.3. Neither Fish Nor Fowl:  Private Rights under Public Ownership 
Private property rights are among the fundamental concepts 
upon which Western civilization rests and IPR was born out of a 
predominantly Western concept of private property rights, 
individualism, and personal freedom.67  In an international context, 
the objectives of TRIPs are to promote liberalization of the global 
trading system while ensuring the private monopoly rights of 
intellectual property proprietors by curbing counterfeiting and 
eliminating piracy.68  The first sentence of the preamble of the 
TRIPs Agreement affirms these goals by explicitly identifying the 
need to protect private interests by committing members to a 
shared objective of “[d]esiring to reduce distortions and 
impediments to international trade, and taking into account the 
need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights.”69 
 
65 See XIAN FA, art. 35 (1982) (P.R.C) (according to article 35 of the Chinese 
Constitution, Chinese citizens “enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, 
of association, of procession and of demonstration”). 
66 See Yu, supra note 23, at 29 (noting the Chinese government’s view that 
politically sensitive materials in the media could destabilize the regime and are 
thus regulated tightly). 
67 See Eric M. Griffin, Stop Relying on Uncle Sam!—A Proactive Approach to 
Copyright Protection in the People’s Republic of China, 6 TEX.  INTELL.  PROP.  L.J. 169, 
182 (1998) (illustrating that in Chinese culture, copying is not seen as harmful but 
instead as a form of flattery). 
68 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(The Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights [TRIPs], Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993,  33 
I.L.M. 81. 
69 Id. at pmbl. (emphasis omitted). 
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However, influenced by communist ideology and collectivist 
mentality, the Chinese community has traditionally classified 
private rights as individualization, which is considered disgraceful 
and shameful.70  Unlike most developed countries which hold 
sacred private rights, emphasizing their abstract and universal 
nature, the Constitution of China does not explicitly address IPR.71  
It does, in contrast, place a strong emphasis on the public interest 
in terms of rights and responsibilities.72  Despite the fact that 
Marxist fundamentalism has been superseded by the new 
“pragmatic” Chinese leadership, the legacy of communitarian 
thought in itself has entrenched inertia.  As Weatherley explains, 
one possibly significant point to be drawn from the Chinese 
practice and preference of defining rights is the unequivocal 
rejection of the concept that rights are universal.73  In a similar 
vein, Palmer observes that, a notable characteristic of China’s legal 
landscape is “the government’s establishment of the interrelated 
doctrines of legal equality and political inequality in the context of 
civil obligations.”74  The comprehension of general private rights is 
nascent and, as such, the legislation for protecting them is in some 
senses rudimentary.  Despite the introduction of a 2004 
amendment to China’s Constitution that provides protection to 
private property,75 China still has a long road ahead to streamline 
their policies and deepen their ongoing reforms, such as 
integrating the amended provisions into existent laws and 
regulations. 
 
70 Indeed, in Chinese society, values to the individual are secondary to the 
values that would accrue to the communities.  While China is gradually re-
introducing notions of private ownership, the process is likely to be lengthy and 
tortuous.  WEATHERLEY, supra note 10, at 93. 
71 See DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 18-21 (1967). 
72 See  XIAN FA arts. 10, 13 (1982) (P.R.C.) (emphasizing the “public interest” 
in terms of expropriation and requisition of land and private properties). 
73 See WEATHERLEY, supra note 10, at 107 (stressing the importance of the 
collective interest over that of the individual). 
74 Palmer, supra note 19, at 454. 
75 On March 14, 2004, China’s NPC adopted a series of landmark 
amendments to the state Constitution, including special provisions that deliver 
protections to human rights and private property rights.  For example, Article 33 
of the amended Constitution has a third paragraph inserted, which reads “The 
State respects and preserves human rights.” See Xian Fa, art. 33 (2004) (P.R.C.),  
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/05/content 
_1381906.htm  (last visited Nov. 21, 2008). 
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2.4. Institutional Anachronism:  Centralized Bureaucracy and 
Dispersed Responsibilities 
It is an interesting phenomenon that the management of 
counterfeiting and piracy has, in many circumstances, outstripped 
official punitive measures.76  Regardless of the financial aspect, the 
low efficiency of the entrenched bureaucracy is an important 
reason.  The continued rhetoric of those who lobby for external 
pressure against China over a strengthened domestic enforcement 
reveals an overwhelming degree of ignorance about the “Chinese 
exceptionalism” in implementing international norms through the 
conservative and bureaucratic colossus.77 
Effective enforcement calls for optimal allocation of 
responsibilities and resources among different authorities to ensure 
transparency and accountability at various levels.  Unfortunately, 
China’s vertical administrative system demonstrates significant 
scope for overlapping jurisdictions between enforcement 
institutions, which exhibit a substantial degree of heterogeneity 
across regions and result in parallel enforcement mechanisms.78  A 
notable challenge in practice falls in the determination as to who 
asserts jurisdiction over the enforcement, which, in many 
instances, results in continuous bureaucratic turf battles among 
various national ministries and between central and local 
government administrations.79  For example, the Ministry of 
Commerce (“MOFCOM”)—Chinese chief negotiator equivalent to 
the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”)—acts merely as a 
coordinator over enforcement agencies and has no direct authority 
over domestic enforcement as the USTR does.  This has led to 
 
76 See Transitional Review Mechanism of China, Council for Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, IP/C/W/371 (Aug. 29, 2002) (evaluating 
the transparency and transposition  of Chinese trade regulations and noting the 
strong capabilities of pirates and weak official punitive actions). 
77 ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 2, 22–34 (2005) (noting that the application of foreign 
pressure as diplomatic tool, has to be tailored into China’s circumstances). 
78 Daniel C. K. Chow, Enforcement Against Counterfeiting in the People’s 
Republic of China, NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 454–55 (2000). 
79 Daniel C. K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, 78 WASH. 
U. L. Q. 1, 32 (2000). 
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instances where effective enforcement has been frustrated and 
counteracted by bureaucratic rivalries.80 
Having successfully carried out its mission of promoting a 
positive result from the WTO negotiations through the domestic 
bureaucracy, MOFCOM has “exhausted its political capital” and 
has little goodwill on which to rely to ensure effective 
implementation of the result.81  Accordingly, it has entered into a 
new phase of implementing these established agreements, and 
thus it is the turn for other ministries such as the State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) to translate 
these agreements into action.82  However, due to the lack of 
expertise and because of the customary departmental 
protectionism, the latter is liable to impede appropriate initiatives 
and therefore decrease working efficiency. 83 
Not surprisingly, since its establishment in the late 1970s, the 
Trademark Office has remained under the control of SAIC, rather 
than being brought within the responsibility of the State 
Intellectual Property Office,84 which oversees only the patent 
matters.85  The Trademark Review and Adjudication Board 
(“TRAB”),86 which should be independent from the Trademark 
Office, is nevertheless under the control of SAIC.87  For example, 
 
80 See Chow, supra note 78, at 453 (noting problems of interpretation, 
application, and enforcement of the law due to a huge government and regulatory 
apparatus). 
81 Mark L. Clifford, China’s Fading Free-Trade Fervor, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, 
June 5, 2002, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jun2002 
/nf2002065_4830.htm. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 The Chinese Patent Office was established in 1980 and was renamed as the 
State Intellectual Property Office in 1998. See, e.g., SIPO, State Intellectual Property 
Office of the P.R.C., http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo_English/ (last visited Dec. 1, 
2008). 
85 Jay Sha, Summary of Changes of Chinese Trademark Law, Jeekai & Partners, 
Beijing China (2001). 
86 The TRAB, an administrative organ established by SAIC, is responsible for 
the review and adjudication of trademarks with respect to the determination of 
the attribution of the trademark, exercising the right of final adjudication on 
matters of trademark review.  A decision of the TRAB is, however, subject to 
judicial review.   See Rules for Trademark Review and Adjudication, 
(promulgated by the State Admin. of Indus. and Commerce, Sept. 17, 2002, 
effective Oct. 17, 2002) LAWINFOCHINA, http://www.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/en/info 
/Article.jsp?a_no=2199&col_no=119&dir=200603 (last visited Nov. 21, 2008) 
(P.R.C.).  
87 Sha, supra note 85. 
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“prior right” or malicious anticipatory registration of marks of 
fame is stipulated in the Trademark Law (2001)88 in an effort to 
prohibit the registration of any mark copying or imitating other 
prior lawful rights.89  These “prior rights” are only recognized and 
accepted by some authorities.  The registration of business names, 
for instance, is managed at different administrative levels and, at a 
local level, limited to a certain geographical area.90  The business 
name registration is governed separately and the resistance to 
recognition of such “prior rights” is far from rare among local AICs 
which are in charge of the registration.91 
The Administration for Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine (“AQSIQ”), which replaced the former State Bureau of 
Quality and Technical Supervision, is also empowered to handle 
infringements of registered trademarks as part of its duty to ensure 
Chinese product quality and standards.92  However, since the 
 
88 See Trademark Law arts. 9, 31  (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Fifth 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, effective Mar. 1, 1983) LAWINFOCHINA, 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/Wbk/displayModeTwo.asp?id=5&keyword= 
(last visited Dec. 11, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
89 See Alexis Weissberger, Note, Is Fame Alone Sufficient to Create Priority 
Rights: An International Perspective on the Viability of the Famous/Well-Known Marks 
Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 739, 771 (2006) (discussing recent changes 
in Chinese trademark law attempting to provide protection for unregistered but 
well-known foreign marks); Sha, supra note 85. 
90 In China, the SAIC is responsible for the approval of business names 
containing such indications as “Zhongguo” or “Zhonghua” (both meaning 
China), “Guojia” (state) or “Guoji” (international), as well as those excluding 
geographical indications.   Accordingly, local AICs are responsible for the 
approval of business names containing a certain geographical indication at the 
same level.  See Provisions for the Administration of Enterprise Name Registration 
(promulgated by State Admin. for Indus. and Commerce, July 22, 1991, effective 
Sept. 1, 1991) Fagui Huiban, (P.R.C.) (outlining procedures for name registration 
for enterprises). 
91 Sha, supra note 85. 
92 In order to keep pace with international standards in light of the accession 
to the WTO, a new legal and administrative enforcement organ named the 
General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine was 
established in April of 2001 through the merger of the existing State 
Administration for Entry-Exit Inspection and Quarantine and the State Quality 
and Technical Supervision Bureau. The AQSIQ in turn created the Standards 
Administration of China (“SAC”) and the China National Regulatory Commission 
for Certification and Accreditation (“CNCA”), both of which operate under the 
supervision of AQSIQ.  The AQSIQ also supervises the WTO TBT Inquiry Centre, 
which operates as a liaison between China and the WTO.  For more information, 
please see the AQSIQ website, General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine of P.R.C., http://english.aqsiq.gov.cn/AboutAQSIQ/ 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
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AQSIQ can only enforce the Product Quality Law, the most an IPR 
proprietor can expect is the fake goods being confiscated or 
destroyed without remedy. 
Similar problems can also be identified with regard to 
copyright. The National Copyright Administration (“NCA”) of 
China, the State Council’s copyright administrative control 
department, is responsible for, inter alia, the implementation of 
national copyright laws and international treaties, investigation of 
infringement cases, administration of external copyright relations 
and guidance for local authorities.93  However, the NCA shares a 
“two in one” (yige bumen liangkuai paizi) administrative mechanism 
with the General Administration of News and Publication. The 
operation of this dual structure has inevitably led to insufficient 
resources and expertise and its arbitrary and incoherent decisions. 
Moreover, some enforcement bodies, such as SAIC and the NCA, 
have seen cutbacks in staff and resources over the past years in 
light of the streamlining and restructuring initiatives of the 
government.94  For example, as of early 2005, China’s Trademark 
Office, which had a backlog of 20,000 long-pending trademark 
cases, was still hearing complaints which were filed in 1999.95 
In July 1994, the Chinese government established within the 
State Council the Intellectual Property Executive Conference 
(“IPEC”), with similar subordinate committees at both the 
ministerial and provincial levels.96  The IPEC is intended to address 
major IPR issues and related strategies, decision-making, 
legislation and enforcement, and international consultation.97  
However, evidence has mounted that it lacks necessary resources 
to carry out its organizational mandate. 98  The Acting Office of 
 
93 National Copyright Administration of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://tinyurl.com/62vgow (last visited Nov. 21, 2008). 
94 Chris Buckley, Pushed on Patents, China Shoves Back, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 
14, 2005, at 13. 
95 Id. 
96 Duan Ruichun, China’s Intellectual Property Rights Protection Towards the 21st 
Century, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 215, 217 (1998). 
97 Id. 
98 Wei Lu, Jiaqiang Xietiao Jizhi Jianquan Zhishi Chanquan Quanli Gongzuo Tixi 
[Consolidate the Coordinating System to Improve the Intellectual Property Rights 
Management], SIPO, Oct. 10, 2003, http://www.cpo.cn.net/zcll/dtbd/gndt 
/t20031010_20092.htm (mentioning that, having been incorporated into the SIPO, 
the IPEC ceased to work in 1998 due to the lack of recourses backed by high-level 
political support). 
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IPEC was initially attached to the Ministry of Science and 
Technology and was soon transferred to the renamed State 
Intellectual Property Office in 1998.  Since then, the IPEC ceased to 
function at the sate level.99 
Ten years later, in 2004, the State Council set up another similar 
IPR enforcement mechanism named National Working Group for 
IPR Protection (“NWGIPR”), where Vice Premier Yi Wu was 
nominated as the Director.100  This “Working Group” is composed 
of various administrative and judicial authorities, namely the 
Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry 
of Commerce, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce, National Copyright Office, State 
Intellectual Property Office and General Administration of 
Customs.101 NWGIPR is intended to enhance cooperation and 
coordination of IPR enforcement throughout the country and 
oversee the handling of major cases involving IPR protection.102 
One significant development, compared with the IPEC, is that, 
under the uniform deployment of the NWGIPR, a cross-
department IPR enforcement collaboration mechanism has been 
established to maximize communication and coordination among 
different dimensions.103  The Acting Office of the NWGIPR, in 
conjunction with other relevant departments, has formulated and 
released China’s Action Plan on IPR Protection 2006, and China’s 
Action Plan on IPR Protection 2007.104  Under the uniform 
leadership of the central government, the NWGIPR has initiated a 
nationwide publicity campaign, aiming at altering and reshaping 
 
99 Id. 
100 See Chinese Vice-Premier on China’s IPR Protection, PEOPLE’S DAILY, Jan. 14, 
2005, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200501/14/eng20050114_170654.html 
(announcing Chinese government’s resolve to protect intellectual property rights). 
101 See Ruichun, supra note 96, at 217 (referring to IPEC’s collaboration with 
an inter-agency task force). 
102 Id. 
103 Wu Yi, Vice Premier, State Council (P.R.C.), the China-U.S. IPR 
Roundtable (Jan. 13, 2005) http://bzb2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/speechactivity 
/200506/20050600134741.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008). 
104 See China’s Action Plan on IPR Protection 2006 (P.R.C.), 
http://www.china.org.cn/enlish/China/167370.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) 
(defining China’s goals for protecting intellectual property rights in 2006); China’s 
Action Plan on IPR Protection 2007 (Working Group Office, Apr. 6, 2007) (P.R.C.), 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/China/207534.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2008) 
(outlining China’s 2007 intellectual property rights protection plan). 
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public perception towards IPR protection.105  Pursuant to the 
requirement of the central government, all provinces, autonomous 
regions and municipalities have established their own branches of 
NWGIPR as state executive agencies overseeing the enforcement of 
IPR in various regions. 106 
To form such a cross-ministry entity comprising several 
competent ministries and judicial authorities is without doubt a 
major undertaking.  As a sign of greater efforts to protect IPR, 
subsequent to the establishment of the NWGIPR, the State Council 
launched a prolonged anti-infringement campaign scheduled from 
September 2004 to August 2005.107  During the campaign, special 
attention was given to seven areas where large amounts of fake 
products were identified—Beijing, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, 
Shandong, Guangdong and Fujian.108  According to the statistics, 
during only the first two months of this campaign, the police 
investigated more than one thousand IPR infringement cases, 
involving 550 million Chinese Yuan (equivalent to 66.5 million U.S. 
dollars).109  Meanwhile, the Beijing Administration for Industry 
and Commerce (“AIC”) recently cracked down on Xiu Shui 
Market, a renowned tourist spot adjacent to embassy area where 
many named brands were available at a fraction of the normal 
retail price.110 
To launch a nationwide campaign is, without doubt, an 
effective way to crack down on IPR infringements and this has 
proved to be one of the most potent approaches to handling 
counterfeiting and piracy in China.  Indeed, in such a country 
where politics is prioritized and propaganda plays a big part, 
gearing up the state’s massive bureaucratic apparatus and 
whipping up widespread sentiments and supports are common 
 
105 Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, Marked Progress was 
Made in IPR Protection Work in China, Jan. 20, 2005, available at 
http://preview.english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/counselorsreport/europereport 
/200501/20050100015005.html. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 2005 Daji Daoban Yinxiang Zhipin Zhuanxiang Xingdong Chuzhan Gaojie [The 
Cracking Down Campaign Has Met its First Goal], SHDF, available at 
http://www.gapp.gov.cn/cms/html/21/367/200512/444748.html. 
109 Chinese Vice-Premier on China’s IPR Protection, supra, note 100. 
110 See Xiu Shui Partially Demolished, PEOPLE’S DAILY, Nov. 14, 2004, 
http://english.people.com.cn/200411/13/eng20041113_163780.html   
(announcing the destruction of Beijing’s famous Silk Market). 
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ways for the government to advance a hard-to-discern goal. This 
explains the circumstances in which campaigns for IPR protection 
are normally organized and coordinated by a mixed executive 
group consisting at key members of different department agencies 
and, sometimes, even judicial bodies are included in this mixed 
executive group.111  However, this kind of anti-infringement 
campaign is policy-oriented in response to the external diplomatic 
pressure, and thus has only intermittent and temporary effect. 
2.5. Climbing a Tree to Seek Fish:  Pursuing Transparency in “Camera 
Obscura” 
Transparency is an important WTO principle,112 and, to this 
end, maintenance of a case-reporting system for both 
administrative and judicial mechanisms is a necessity.113  Without 
such a system, powers are apt to be abused and efficiency 
hindered.114  Transparency as a WTO principle had been 
anticipated to be used as leverage to promote predictability and 
significantly alter the image of China’s legal system upon its WTO 
accession.  While China has been implementing systematic reform 
towards its legal system, this expectation appeared to be over-
optimistic. 
Indeed, despite the public enthusiasm for building the 
principle of rule of law in administration and judiciary, 
transparency in both administrative and judicial mechanisms in 
China remains elusive.  For example, the government’s legal 
gazette often fails to provide updated notice of changes in 
administrative rules and regulations and the public has no steady 
and direct access to legal databases.115 Moreover, the particular 
nature of China’s legal system is largely reflected in what is 
 
111 In China, the judicial body at the central level consists of the Supreme 
People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. 
112 Key WTO transparency provisions include GATT Articles 3 and 10, and 
TRIPs Article 63, which contain substantively similar obligations involving trade 
in goods, services and intellectual property respectively. 
113 Yonehara, supra note 12, at 100. 
114 Id. at 101. 
115 See Reiko R. Feaver, Comment, China’s Copyright Law and The TRIPs 
Agreement, 5 J. TRANAT’L L. & POL. 431, 455–56 (1996) (describing lack of 
transparency of Chinese rules and regulations). See also Yonehara, supra note 12, at 
101 (stating that the government’s failure to note changes in administrative rules 
and regulations in the legal gazette does little to create an opportunity for the rule 
of law). 
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categorized as internal (neibu) provisions and interpretations, 
which are normally unavailable to the public and which may be in 
contradiction with published laws and regulations.116 
The lack of transparency, to a large extent, can be attributed to 
the Chinese cultural preference for organizing systems by human 
relationship instead of regulation.117  Political compromise and 
consensus are usually reached in “smoke-filled rooms” rather than 
in a public arena.  In a system driven by personal favors 
characterized by “attaining objectives in camera obscura” (anxiang 
caozuo), transparency becomes problematic.  As a consequence, the 
enforcement of IPR by relevant agencies has become a major 
structural problem within the bureaucracy, a system with a high 
degree of discretion based largely on “back door” political 
manipulation.118  The intention of circumventing the excessive 
bureaucratic red tape leads to reluctance in addressing IPR 
infringements, and many IPR proprietors have to seek remedy and 
assistance without going through legal proceedings.119 
2.6. Political Autocracy and Economic Decentralism:  Central 
Government is Ambitious Whereas Local Authorities are 
Ambiguous 
With its comprehensive legislative structure, China has the 
good will to eliminate infringements, but the central leaders 
sometimes have difficulties convincing local authorities and 
controlling their commercial behavior.120  In local regions, the 
saying goes, “The mountains are high, and the Emperor is far 
away” (shan gao huangdi yuan). 121 The vast extent of land and the 
 
116 Patrick H. Hu, The China 301 on Market Access: A Prelude to GATT 
Membership?, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 131, 144 (1994). 
117 Id. 
118 See Lubman, supra note 47, at 390–91 (discussing the broad discretion 
granted to Chinese administrative agencies and their potential for arbitrariness). 
119 See Susan Tiefenbrun, Piracy of Intellectual Property in China and the Former 
Soviet Union and Its Effects upon International Trade: A Comparison, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 
11 (1998) (comparing China and Russia’s intellectual property regimes and piracy 
with respect to economy, political history and ideology, culture, and adequacy of 
the legal system to enforce the regimes). 
120 Gregory S. Feder, Note, Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China: 
You Can Lead a Horse to Water, But You Can’t Make It Drink, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 223, 
253 (1996). 
121 Yonehara, supra note 12, at 82 (internal citation omitted). 
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sheer size of China’s population constrains effective monitoring of 
implementation of the national strategy towards IPR protection.122 
The intractability encountered by Chinese central policymakers 
in bringing their initiatives into full play has been a common 
problem in China.123  Ironically, the massive spread of regionalism 
may have been inadvertently fostered by the central government in 
Deng’s era,124 as one short-term strategy to encourage certain 
people and certain regions125 to prosper before others.126  Since the 
end of the 1970s when the “open-door” policy was initiated, 
Chinese leaders have viewed the devolution of central authority to 
local regions as a necessary means of fostering economic growth.127  
Local authorities have been equipped with considerable decision-
making power in establishing necessary institutions and 
conducting independent economic activities.128  It is the policy of 
decentralization and differentiation that fueled the emergence of 
the Special Economic Zones (“SEZ”) in the southern provinces.129  
In the decade since the SEZ was set up, “the Chinese political 
structure has been transformed from one that was once reputed for 
its high degree of centralization and effectiveness into one in which 
the center has difficulty coordinating its own agents’ behavior.”130  
 
122 Id. 
123 Donald Clarke, Private Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China, 
10 (2) NBR ANALYSIS 33 (1999). 
124 In 1978, the landmark Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Central 
Committee of the Communist Party encouraged local political autonomy and the 
economic decentralization as a strategy to recover the national economy. See, e.g., 
CHINA DECONSTRUCTS: POLITICS, TRADE AND REGIONALISM 5 (David S. G. Goodman 
& Gerald Segal eds., 1994) [hereinafter China Deconstructs] (noting that 
“[d]ecentralization and the introduction of market force suggest in general terms 
that the centers of the economic power are moving away from the centre to the 
localities and away from the CCP and the government”). 
125 This differentiated policy reflected Deng Xiaoping‘s well-known motto, 
“allowing certain part of the country to be developed first (rang bufen diqu xian 
fu qi lai).” Coastal and border areas were encouraged to make full use of their 
geopolitical locations and comparative advantages in an effort to attract foreign 
trade and investment. Id. at 2. 
126 Willard, supra note 3, at 417. 
127 See, e.g., CHINA DECONSTRUCTS, supra note 124, at 2; see also Jeffrey W. 
Berkman, Intellectual Property Rights in the P.R.C.: Impediments to Protection and the 
Need for the Rule of Law, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J.  1, 17 (1996) (describing the 
relationship between rule of law and intellectual property rights). 
128 CHINA DECONSTRUCTS, supra note 124, at 2–5. 
129 Id. at 2. 
130 Lubman, supra note 47, at 385 (quoting Shaoguang Wang, The Rise of the 
Regions: Fiscal Reform and the Decline of Central State Capacity in China, in THE 
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When the central government released its rigid control over the 
local authorities in an effort to facilitate economic growth, the 
steady growth of regional power bases and the gradual erosion of 
central authority turned out to be a nightmare that Chinese leaders 
would never have considered possible.131 
In this context, it is not surprising that central government 
works in earnest while local authorities remain unconvinced that a 
result will follow.  As a consequence, central government is 
naturally facing domestic resistance in its effort to promote IPR 
protection.132  Driven by economic interests vested in different 
regions, relevant organizations and departments are more or less 
playing the role of conniving with the spread of the counterfeiting 
and piracy.  Cutting off the profit chain behind the counterfeits is 
key to curbing the problems.133 
The central government has attempted to “delocalize” 
(shouquan) power over the past years.134  In September 2006, Chen 
Liangyu was ousted from his position as the Party Commissioner 
of Shanghai. 135  This has been arguably interpreted as a concrete 
step of the central government to tackle regionalism.136  While 
measures are being taken, doubts still remain as to whether local 
protectionism can be eradicated eventually.  Here little is possible 
without creating a truly independent legal system immune from 
administrative interference.  There has, however, been little hint of 
making this a reality in the near future. 
 
WANING OF THE COMMUNIST STATE: ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF POLITICAL DECLINE IN 
CHINA AND HUNGARY 87, 109 (Andrew G. Walder ed., 1995)). 
131 Id. 
132 Cheng, supra note 21, at 1979. 
133 Id. at 1982–83. 
134 See, e.g., Zhongyang Jiang Ba “Ren Cai Wu” Cong Difang Shouhui [The Central 
Government will Delocalize the Power in Managing Human, Material and Financial 
Resources], IFENG NEWS, Nov. 16, 2006,  http://news.ifeng.com/mainland 
/200611/1116_17_33594.shtml. 
135 See Wu Zhong, Out from Under Jiang’s Shadow, ASIA TIMES, Sept. 27, 2006, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/HI27Ad01.html  (mentioning that 
Chen’s removal “certainly is a great help in checking the increasingly rampant 
regionalism enabling Beijing’s macroeconomic control policy to be faithfully 
carried out at the local level”). 
136 Id. 
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2.7. Dynamic Intellectual Property under Rigid Education Model 
The educational regime in China often acts in a negatory 
manner in promoting the evolution of collectivist mentality and 
instilling an ethos hostile to counterfeiting and piracy.137  On the 
contrary, it fuels the perception that the concept of intellectual 
property is exotic (bolaipin) and that intellectual creation is the 
property of human civilization.138  As a result, while intellectual 
property has become popular jargon in China, the overwhelming 
majority of Chinese officials and citizenry do not genuinely 
comprehend the general principles of intellectual property law and 
would be antipathetic to theories about the role of intellectual 
property law in encouraging creativity and contributing to 
economic well-being.139 
Moreover, the special Chinese education model is largely built 
on faultless recitation of classical works in a process of rote 
learning,140 which is typically considered as mechanical 
memorization.141  Those who can recite the classical works and 
cram for their examinations are usually assured academic success 
and public recognition.142  In such a force-fed environment, 
students are ingrained with a plenitude of information and treated 
as subservient repositories of knowledge.143 This education model 
arguably hinders original thought and fosters a tendency of 
imitation rather than creation.144 
2.8. “Rule of Law” or “Rule by Law?”:  Struggle of the Judiciary in 
Adhering to “the Correct Political Orientation” 
In China, the standards adopted by the courts for calculating 
economic damages tied to piracy—an essential factor for making 
 
137 Lingdi Zhu, Cong Majang Duize de Bentuxing Kan Zhongguo Zhishi 
Chanquan Fa Yizhi [Legal Transplant of Intellectual Property Law in China: Reflections 
from the Indigenous Nature of the Rule of Majang], LEGAL DAILY, Dec. 2, 2004, available 
at http://www.china.com.cn/chinese/OP-c/719075.htm. 
138 Id. 
139 Cheng, supra note 21, at 1998. 
140 Griffin, supra note 67, at 183. 
141 See N. Wingrove, China Traditions Oppose War on IP Piracy, 38(3) 
Research-Tech. Mgmt. 6–7 (1995) (summarizing the challenges faced by U.S. 
intellectual property rights proponents in China). 
142 Griffin, supra note 67, at 183. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
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ultimate prosecutorial decisions—are normally based on the value 
of the infringing products in the pirate market rather than the 
value in the legitimate market.145  As a result, the low value of 
judicial fines and penalties are frequently viewed as “paltry” and 
regarded by infringers as “mere cost of doing business.” 146  As has 
been reported, Microsoft has prevailed in taking legal actions 
against infringements, resulting in an award for compensation of 
only $2,500, which is controversially low.147  Sega Enterprises sued 
for punitive damages and a permanent injunction and was 
awarded $3,000 as compensation.148  The lack of commitment 
towards punishing infringers has only encouraged them to become 
bolder and put a premium on committing infractions.149 
More importantly, it is culturally acceptable within Chinese 
society for violators to “openly flaunt the law by relying on 
protection from friends [and relatives] in government.”150  Social 
and personal networks with influential individuals are the most 
important resources and are usually more effective than legal 
provisions in seeking appropriate remedies.151  Indeed, as the 
Chinese proverb goes, “having friends in government is key to 
quenching everything intractable (chao zhong you ren hao banshi).”  
Although anecdotal, social network (guanxi) does play a significant 
and sometimes decisive role in shaping typical Chinese society.152  
When encountering difficult problems, people tend to pursue 
solutions through personal relationships rather than legal support 
as the avenue of first recourse.153  The use of such networks to 
interfere with judicial decisions is common in China.  Certain cases 
 
145 See Excerpt from the IIPA Special 301 Recommendations  (Feb. 24, 1997), 
http://www.ipr.gov.cn/cn/zhuanti/meiIPzhuanlan/1997interIP301material.doc. 
146 Id. at 29. 
147 Chen, supra note 22, at 16. 
148 Id. 
149 Education Key to Protecting Inventors’ Interests, CHINA DAILY, July 26, 2004, 
available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-07/26/content 
_351673.htm. 
150 Willard, supra note 3, at 430. 
151 See Bejesky, supra note 1, at 474 (mentioning that “[p]ersonal connections 
with key individuals in emerging market countries are often more important than 
the written law”). 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
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are specifically categorized as “guanxi cases,” and are expected to 
receive differential treatment and favorable outcome.154  
Moreover, the judicial system in China is still dependent upon 
local administration in finance and personnel.155  As Palmer 
describes, the judicial organ continuously serves as “an abiding 
stronghold of politicized administration of law,” as it was before 
legal reform.156  Under “unified leadership of the Party,” a judge in 
China is de facto a governmental official, and it is apparent that 
most of the judges are complacent about the political status quo.157  
As a consequence, courts are still expected to follow instructions 
articulated by the Party Committee and the government, notably in 
the interim campaigns against crime, including anti-counterfeiting 
campaigns, which have proved to be a palliative rather than a 
cure.158 Indeed, there is a slogan which has been given wide 
publicity within the Chinese judicial system: “keeping firmly to the 
correct political orientation of the judiciary (jianchi shenpan gongzuo 
de zhengzhi fangxiang).”159  Succumbing to pressures from the local 
government, judges have politically been trained to be compliant, 
bearing in mind to “provide escort service” (bao jia hu hang) for 
local economy.  Under this scenario, it is not unsurprising that 
judges may appear partial to local parties and government.160 
3. INITIATE FOUR SHIFTS:  CLUES TO THE PERENNIAL CONUNDRUM 
The above passage has demonstrated the rooted reasons for the 
IPR enforcement problems in China.  One potentially interesting 
testing ground that has not been empirically explored in much 
depth is how to identify the dominating aspect of the targeted 
 
154 Lubman, supra note 47, at 396. 
155 See Cheng, supra note 21, at 1992 (discussing the Chinese judicial system’s 
“inability to render impartial judgments” due to its dependence on local officials). 
156 See Lubman, supra note 47, at 398 (explaining that Chinese judges act 
primarily as bureaucrats. 
157 See id. 
158 Id. 
159 For example, Xiao Yang, the President of Supreme People’s Court, gave 
emphasis during an interview that the Court must respect the leadership of the 
Party conscientiously and keep firmly to the correct political orientation. See Xiao 
Yang, Kexue Fazhan Fayuan Shiye, Tuoshan Chuli Shi Ge Guanxi [Improving Judiciary 
through Coping with Ten essential Relationships], XINHUA NEWS, Jan. 5, 2006, available 
at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-01/05/content_4014729.htm (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2006). 
160 Cheng,  supra note 21, at 1992-93. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
570 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 30:2 
 
problem and discover the key to undoing the Gordian Knot.  Here 
this article seeks to demystify the perennial conundrum and 
provide strategic solutions to the existing enforcement problems. 
3.1. Fostering a Shift in China from Rule by Law to Rule of Law 
Political freedom depends on economic freedom while 
economic freedom over a lengthy period of time serves as a 
catalyst for the creation of political freedom.161 China is currently 
experiencing a critical transition–economic reform has not only 
given impetus to economic prosperity but also fostered the growth 
of socio-economic inequality and complexity, such as regional 
disparities, rampant income gaps,162 and rising unemployment.163  
As a result, citizens suffer from spiritual emptiness and 
utilitarianism dominates many people’s minds throughout the 
country.  In addition, the restriction of religious belief and the 
tough control over freedom of speech have exacerbated the 
instability of the country.  In this context, counterfeiting and piracy 
are by-products of the defective political infrastructure.  Due to this 
background, it is of great significance for Chinese government to 
 
161 Allison & Lin, supra note 35, at 774 (quoting Milton Friedman, The Relation 
between Economic Freedom and Political Freedom, in CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7 
(1962)). 
162 According to official statistics released by the International Poverty 
Reduction Centre in China, the absolute number of the poor people and the 
poverty rate remain staggeringly high despite the overall economic prosperity. By 
the end of 2004, the number of the poor rural residents who were unable to feed 
themselves adequately reached 26.1 million. The gap of income between the rich 
and the poor continued to widen. From 1992 to 2004, the ratio between the income 
of the urban residents and that of the rural residents increased from 2.33:1 to 3.2:1. 
See Gao Hongbin, Deputy Director General of the State Council Leading Group 
Office of Poverty Alleviation and Development, Address at Regional Policy 
Seminar on Pro-Poor Growth and Scaling Up Poverty Reduction in East Asia 
(May 18, 2005), http://www.iprcc.org.cn/item/2006-09-25/50547.html.  China’s 
income gap widened in the first quarter of 2005, with 10 percent of its richest 
people enjoying 45 percent of the country’s wealth, while China’s poorest 10 
percent had only 1.4 percent of the nation’s wealth. See Income Gap in China Widens 
in First Quarter, CHINA DAILY, June 19, 2005, available at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-06/19/content_452636.htm. 
163 In March 2005, 11 million urban residents, including those entering the 
workplace for the first time, ex-servicemen and college graduates, were awaiting 
employment.  There are now 13 million unemployed and laid-off urban workers, 
and large numbers of surplus rural labourers need to find jobs in urban areas.  See 
China Expects Higher Urban Unemployment Rate in 2005, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, 
Mar. 7, 2005,  http://english.people.com.cn/200503/06/eng20050306 
_175774.html. 
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facilitate rule of law system and provide its citizenry minimum 
freedom of expression and religion.  It is a stop-gap measure that 
can easily be undone by a strategic policy that encourages the 
creation of a sound environment for such development. 
Nevertheless, China has demonstrated “a desire to join the 
global stage,” that will force China to “undergo a tortuous path . . . 
as it navigates from an isolated socialist country to a market-
oriented, centrally-planned regime”164 where individual liberty 
and private property rights are protected under the rule of law.165  
The political transition will inevitably continue, driven by China’s 
continuous economic dynamism, social challenges, and global 
integration.166  While it is still too early to predict the future path of 
political reform in China, there are some encouraging signs that 
China’s integration with the outside world and the new policy 
initiatives of building a “harmonious society”167 might, in time, 
lead to a stable form of political liberalization.168 
The 1990s have witnessed the beginning of what could well be 
an unprecedented wave of political reform with Chinese 
leadership addressing the significance to consolidate legal 
institutions,169 “that might curb bureaucratic arbitrariness by 
defining the scope of administrative authority and providing 
remedies for the exercise of arbitrary power.”170  During a visit to 
the United States in April 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao sent 
an unusual signal at a press conference with his pledge to adopt 
democracy in the near future.171  Hu pointed out that, “in the light 
 
164 Yonehara, supra note 12, at 108. 
165 See Zhang, supra note 34, at 13 (describing measures taken by the new 
leadership that emphasizes promoting rule of law, protecting human rights and 
private property, and addressing the problems of the masses). 
166 Id. at 14. 
167 Proposed by President Hu Jintao, “[t]he CPC and the central government 
of China have made it an important task to build a harmonious society [hexie 
shehui], which served the fundamental interests of the people.” See Building 
Harmonious Society CPC’s Top Task, XINHUA NEWS, Feb. 20, 2005, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005_02/20/content_417718.htm. 
168 Halverson, supra note 50, at 363. 
169 As a symbolic move, China’s National People’s Congress amended the 
Chinese Constitution in 1999 to insert the “rule of law” into that document as a 
leading principle. See XIAN FA art. 5 (1999) (P.R.C.). 
170 Lubman, supra note 47, at 392. 
171 At a joint press conference following the Hu-Bush Summit in Washington 
on April 20, 2006, President Hu noted that China would “continue to move ahead 
with the political restructuring and to develop a socialist democracy,” and it will 
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of China’s own national conditions and the will of the Chinese 
people, [China will] continue to move ahead [with] political 
restructuring and to develop a socialist democracy.”172  Unlike all 
of the previous statements of Chinese leaders that addressed 
“China’s own national conditions,” Hu, this time, emphasized both 
“China’s own national conditions” and “the will of the Chinese 
people.”173  While for the time being it is too soon to be certain 
whether it is a slip of the tongue, a political show, or a consensus of 
Chinese leaders, the statement at least signaled a political move in 
the foreseeable future. 
In addition, with the globalization of the domestic market and 
the popularity of the Internet,174 it has become difficult, if not 
impossible, for the government to gain control over all spheres of 
society,175 and the notion of “rule of law“ is slowly filtering into 
people’s minds.  China’s integration into the global trading system 
and its participation in the international rulemaking process will 
profoundly influence Chinese attitudes and ways of thinking. 176  
China has no choice but to burn their bridges and carry out its 
 
“further expand the orderly participation of the Chinese citizens in political affairs 
so that the Chinese citizens will be in a better position to exercise their democratic 
rights in terms of democratic supervision, democratic management, and the 
democratic decision-making.”  Press Release, Office of the White House Press 
Secretary, President Bush Meets with President Hu of the People’s Republic of 
China (Apr. 20, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases 
/2006/04/20060420-1.html. 
172 Id. 
173 See Dehao Fang, Hu Jintao Zhenggai Shumoing Cang Xuanji [The 
Implications of Hu’s Statement towards Political Reform], ASIA TIMES, Apr. 24, 
2006. 
174  Sumner Lemon, Broadband Internet Usage Soars in China, (“The number 
of Chinese Internet users connecting to the Internet over broadband connections 
rose by 173 percent during 2003, according to the latest figures released by China 
Internet Network Information Centre (“CNNIC”) in its Semi-annual Survey 
Report on the Development of the Internet in China.”)  (Jan. 16, 2004), 
http://www.infoworld.com/article/04/01/16/HNchinanetusage_1.html.  In 
2003, China was estimated to have 79.5 million Internet users, up 34.5 percent 
from 59.1 million users in 2002.  See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. 
[UNCTAD], E-Commerce and Development Report, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/SDTE/ECB/20 (2004) (prepared by John Burley), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ecdr2004_en.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2008). 
175 See Halverson, supra note 50, at 364–65 (addressing the widespread 
availability of information over the Internet as an important factor to limit the 
government’s ability in controlling the public). 
176 See id. at 332 (stating that China’s WTO membership will further deepen 
its integration into the world economy and strengthen its active role in the 
international economic arena). 
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ongoing reform despite the complexity and uncertainty entailed. 
China has become an institutional laboratory—the largest of its 
kind in human history—that is freighted with enormous 
implications for the future of the rule of law.177 
3.2. Advocating Undiscounted Policy in Lieu of “Tying Policy” 
Tying sale is the practice of making the sale of one product 
conditional on the purchase of a second distinctive product.178  It is 
a quota sale characterized by a combination package which is 
normally regarded as anti-competitive since it is implied that one 
or more components of the package are sold individually by other 
businesses as their primary product; this bundling of goods, 
therefore, would hurt those businesses.179  Through the practice of 
“tying,” the supplier threatens to withhold the key product, 
thereby increasing sales of products that are considered 
undesirable.180 
In political terms, a “tying sale“ refers to a policy which can 
only be applied in a conditional manner towards a particular 
country, while for other countries this restriction is not 
applicable.181  This conditional treatment serves as leverage to force 
or lure a country into accepting an unfavorable political decision or 
arrangement as an exchange for promise of certain performance.  
Under such circumstances, countries that are being unfairly treated 
will naturally suspect the sincerity of the motives.  Due to lack of 
mutual credibility, it is difficult to push forward a constructive and 
cooperative relationship under the “tying” policy. 
A noticeable example is the United States‘ decision to link 
human rights and trade when dealing with China.182  In the 
 
177 Zhang, supra note 34, at 14. 
178 See, e.g., European Commission, Glossary: Tying or Tied Selling, 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/general_info/t_en.html (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2008). 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 This “conditional” policy has been described by some developing 
countries as “double standards.” See, e.g., Randall P. Peerenboom, Assessing 
Human Rights in China: Why the Double Standard, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 72 (2005) 
(discussing the human rights double standard as applied to China). 
182 See e.g., Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement 
Mechanism for Basic Human Rights:  A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade 
Organization, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 28 (1996) (“[T]he United States . . . 
preferred the use of unilateral actions such as sanctions.  These actions have often 
linked human rights to trade as in the recent China dispute and in numerous 
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aftermath of the Tiananmen Square Protests in 1989, many U.S. 
politicians lobbied to link the normalization of Sino-American 
trade to improvements in China’s human rights record, and 
profound social and political reform in China.183  The U.S. 
Congress and the Clinton administration continued to grant 
annual extensions of normal MFN status and Normal Trade 
Relations Status as leverage to get the concessions they sought 
from China.184  In 2004, the EU emulated the United States by 
linking Market Economy Status (“MES”) to IPR and refusing to 
grant China the MES.185  The EU Commission insisted that 
conditions must be met in order for China to be entitled to the 
MES.186 
 
other instances.”);  Robbyn Reichman-Coad, Human Rights Violations in China:   A 
United States Response, 15 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 163, 185 (1994–95) (“In 
1993, President Clinton followed through with his campaign promise to be tough 
with China and issued an executive order which linked human rights and trade 
benefits. He stated that China’s privileged trade status would not be renewed 
unless the Beijing government significantly improved its human rights record”); 
see also, Evan S. Medeiros, United States-China Relations:  Comparative Security and 
Foreign Policy Processes, NAT’L COMM. ON U.S.-P.R.C. RELATIONS:  CHINA POL’Y 
SERIES, March 2000, at 1, available at http://www.ncuscr.org/our-resources/china-
policy-series/china-policy-series (noting that “Sino-American relations have been 
plagued with a number of difficulties that have complicated the expansion and of 
further institutionalization of political, economic, and military ties between 
Washington and Beijing”). 
183 Medeiros, supra note 182. 
184 Id. 
185 See European Commission, Market Economy Status in Trade Defence 
Investigations (June 28, 2004), http://ec.eurpoa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral 
/countries/china/pr280604_en.htm. (last visited Nov. 13, 2008). MES is a 
technical status granted to a national economy or individual businesses, used by 
trading partners during anti-dumping investigations, for the purpose of assessing 
the conditions under which exported goods are produced.  Id.  
For a comprehensive analysis of MES and Non-Market Economy Status, see 
Joseph A. Laroski, Jr., NMEs: A Love Story—Nonmarket and Market Economy Status 
Under U.S. Antidumping Law, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 369, 370–71, 394–98 (1999). 
186  The conditions include:  
(1) State influence: ensuring equal treatment of all companies by 
reducing state interference, which takes place either on an ad hoc basis 
or as a result of industrial policies, as well as through export and 
pricing restrictions on raw materials; (2) Corporate governance: 
increasing the level of compliance with the existing Accounting Law in 
order to ensure . . . the usability of accounting information for trade 
defence investigations; (3) Property and bankruptcy law: ensuring 
equal treatment of all companies in bankruptcy procedures and in 
respect of property and intellectual property rights; [and] (4) financial 
sector: bringing the banking sector under market rules.  
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The “tying practice“ also happens in the area of IPR 
enforcement in China.  The Chinese government has made 
considerable and remarkable efforts to improve enforcement: the 
speed and scale of actions would be inconceivable in some other 
countries, either due to prohibitive costs, inadequate judiciaries, or 
bureaucratic apparatus and, from the perspective of some legal 
practitioners, the effectiveness of China’s administrative relief is to 
be encouraged and commended. 187  China, however, is much more 
vulnerable to criticism than some other countries because free 
trade has been adulterated with political elements. 
Indeed, it should be a daunting task to separate political and 
commercial considerations in practice; however, looking back to 
China’s previous and current reactions, it may be true that this 
“conditional treatment” appears only to render matters more 
difficult.  Up to this point, in order to facilitate the process of 
China’s IPR enforcement, trade partners of China are advised to 
abandon the conditional treatment, and readjust its strategic 
mentality to be in line with the present status.  But how to handle 
this is a knotty task that should be dealt with prudently. 
3.3. Facilitating Conversion of China from an “IP Imitation” to an “IP 
Creation” Nation 
As has been demonstrated by both legal scholars and 
economists, if the establishment of an IPR legal system lacks social 
foundation on which adequate economic values of the system have 
been fully realized, the incentives of innovation may recede and 
the underpinnings that sustain creativities may collapse.188 
Unfortunately, this is what has been happening in some 
developing countries, of course including China, in the area of IPR 
protection. 
 
187 Alan Adcock, Opportunity Knocks for IP Owners in China, IAM MAGAZINE, 
Feb. 1, 2004. 
188 See, e.g., Stefan Kirchanski, Protection of U.S. Patent Rights in Developing 
Countries:  U.S. Efforts To Enforce Pharmaceutical Patents in Thailand, 16 LOY. LA. 
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 569, 598 (1994); Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO TRIPs Agreement 
and Global Economic Development, in PUBLIC POLICY AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL 
INTEGRATION 3, 4–12 (1997) (discussing that a tolerant IPR policy fuels economic 
development until the country reaches the stage where IPR protection becomes 
economically advantageous to a sufficiently strong set of domestic vested 
interests). 
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3.3.1. Lack of Home-grown Intellectual Property 
As Allison and Lin have observed, “China has followed the 
typical pattern of a developing nation by depending heavily on 
foreign investment and imported technology before being able to 
generate substantial internal growth and technological 
advancement on its own.”189  Indeed, for a long time, China lacked 
genuine enthusiasm and native intelligence to enforce IPR, since 
providing substantial IPR protection within the confines of TRIPs 
Agreement does not render immediate economic benefits to the 
Chinese economy.190  For many Chinese companies, strengthened 
IPR protection implies that domestic enterprises are obliged to pay 
a colossal sum of royalties to foreign proprietors, thereby resulting 
in escalating production costs and shrinking profit margins.191  
Correspondingly, most Chinese enterprises have been content to 
making imitation products and have invested little capital and 
made little effort to develop their own innovative technologies.192 
However, to create home-grown intellectual property in China 
is indispensable.193 Over the years, Chinese companies have 
suffered huge losses in the international market as a result of 
lacking independent intellectual property.194  According to a 
survey conducted by Deloitte & Touche, a professional services 
firm, as of 2004, Chinese manufacturers were compelled to pay 
license fees ranging from fifteen to twenty-two percent on DVD 
players that retail for less than sixty dollars.195  It was also reported 
that royalty payment to Intel and Microsoft accounted to fifty to 
 
189 Allison & Lin, supra note 35, at 775. 
190 Cheng, supra note 21, at 1979. 
191 See Hong Kong Trade Development Council, Changes in China’s IPR 
System, 10 Business Alert – China (2000), http://info.hktdc.com/alert 
/cba-e0010b.htm. 
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193 Yahong Li, The Wolf Has Come:  Are China’s Intellectual Property Industries 
Prepared for the WTO? 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 101 (2002). 
194 Id. 
195 See Press Release, David Schutzman & Evonne Lum, Technology Firms 
Risk Losing Advantage as China’s Influence on Global Standards Reaches Critical 
Levels: (Aug. 4, 2004),  http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/press_release 
/0,1014,cid%253D56070,00.html.  
See also United States Trade Representative [USTR],  2006 Special 301 USTR 
Report (2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports 
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seventy percent of the retail price of computers manufactured in 
China.196 
Apparently, Chinese leaders and entrepreneurs need to 
enhance the awareness of protection for indigenous intellectual 
property. 197  A notable example is China’s inadequate protection 
for traditional Chinese medicine (TCM)—the Chinese “national 
treasure” which has a history of thousands of years. 198  Though 
having a comparative advantage in TCM products, China has few 
TCM brands that have established their dominant positions at 
domestic and global markets.199  By the December 2005, the trade 
value of TCM exceeded forty billion dollars in the global market 
and is growing at a staggering rate of ten percent annually, 
whereas China home-made TCM constitutes less than three 
percent of the total value.200  By contrast, TCM enterprises in Japan, 
Korea, Southeast Asia, and Western Europe purchase raw herbal 
materials in China and, after rough processing locally in China, 
transport them into their own countries where the raw materials 
are refined and the exacts are transmuted into finished products.201  
Such TCM products are not only placed in the foreign market but 
also resold to the Chinese market at enormously escalated prices.202  
Currently, China’s TCM import from Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, 
and Western Europe is valued as high as more than one hundred 
million dollars.203 
Due to the lack of independent intellectual property, there has 
not been much incentive for lobbies of inventors or authors who 
would benefit from higher IPR enforcement.204  Correspondingly, 
 
196 Richard P. Suttmeier & Yao Xiangkui, China’s Post-WTO Technology Policy: 
Standards, Software, and the Changing Nature of Techno-Nationalism, 7 NBR SPECIAL 
REP. 7, 20 (2004) (quoting Sherman So, Low-cost Chip Is Made for China, SOUTH 
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 17, 2004). 
197 Li, supra note 193, at 101. 
198 Id. 
199 See, China Losing TCM Intellectual Property, CHINA NEWS NETWORK, 
December 13, 2005, available at http://www.chinanews.cn/news/2005/2005-12-
13/15742.html. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. 
204 See Tara Kalagher Giunta & Lily H. Shang, Ownership of Information in a 
Global Economy, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L. & ECON. 327, 331 (1993) (noting how there 
is inadequate protection of intellectual property in developing countries at both 
the substantive law and envorcement levels). 
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the Chinese government has felt little internal pressure to enforce 
IPR.205  In other words, Chinese leaders have no explicit political 
will to substantially enforce IPR.  In order to build a healthy 
ecosystem of innovation, China needs to establish an independent 
domestic intellectual property industry that is required to move 
the manufacturing economy up the value chain.206 
3.3.2. Value Chain Restructuring:  From “Made in China” to 
“Innovated in China” 
Enriching homegrown intellectual property intelligence and 
establishing domestic intellectual property landscape constitute the 
logic start of the intellectual property value chain.207  Therefore, it 
is of great importance to facilitate China’s transition from a mere 
consumer of IPR to a net creator, in other words, from “made in 
China” to “innovated in China.” 208  Construction of a system 
balancing protection and exploitation is therefore indispensable for 
the establishment of a cycle of an intellectual creation.209  It is 
objectively unlikely that the conversion of China from an “IP 
imitation” to an “IP creation” nation can be achieved without the 
process of the innovation capacity building. 
Universities and research institutions are expected to harness 
the potential of their technologies to bridge the gaps of Research 
and Development (R&D), and to contribute at certain stage in the 
value chain.210  In order to make China an “IP creation” nation, it is 
necessary to establish a mechanism by which universities and 
research institutes can create independent and internationally 
competitive intellectual property to be used to the maximum 
extent possible in the society.211  Based on such awareness, China 
needs to put in place measures with the aim of encouraging the 
 
205 Id. 
206 A company’s value chain is normally defined as “an interdependent 
system or network of activities, connected by linkages.” For further discussion, 
see Michael E. Porter, Competition in Global Industries: A Conceptual Framework, in 
COMPETITION IN GLOBAL INDUSTRIES 15, 20–22 (1986). 
207 Bill Barrett & Dave Crawford, Integrating the Intellectual Property Value 
Chain, 20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY BE43-BE46 (2002). 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open 
Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1090–91 
(2005). 
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creation of R&D assets at universities and research institutes and 
establishing a comparative environment in the society.212  To this 
end, China is expected to establish an innovative paradigm where 
IPR is viewed as an essential ingredient. China also needs to 
reconfigure and revamp its education system for lateral thinking—
”thinking out of the box,” instead of traditional rote learning213—
and strive to evolve the nation into a role of being more of a world 
innovator than a world manufacturer.214 
3.3.3. Trend Assessment:  “Well Begun is Half Done” 
An old Chinese adage says “well begun is half done.“  Most 
encouragingly, there have been signs which may reflect an 
auspicious beginning for the emergence of a sound IPR 
enforcement system.  China has initiated the transformation of 
itself from orthodox Marxism to “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics (you zhongguo tese de shehuizhuyi),215 and has 
demonstrated outstanding dedication and commitment towards 
embracing a strengthened IPR enforcement system.216  As Yahong 
Li suggests, upon its accession to the WTO, Chinese enterprises 
depending heavily on imitation of foreign products are liable to 
suffer from losing market share.217  The fierce competition provides 
the companies with no options but to innovate by reexamining 
business strategies and reallocating their resources.218  In order to 
survive in the fierce competition characterized by technological 
contests, these companies have to promote industrial 
transformations and reinforce their innovation capacities.219 
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Based on this awareness, over the past decade or so, a 
momentum of a rapid and continuous development in IPR 
protection has been maintained in China.220 According to the 
statistics released by SIPO, the total number of applications of 
these kinds of patents reached 694,153 in 2007, an increase of 473 
percent compared to 121,150 in 1998.221  As the Figure shows 
below, while there has been less sign of growth among foreign 
applicants and this may have more or less blurred any clear profile 
for the transformation of China from an “IP imitation” to an “IP 
creation” nation, during the past ten years, applications by 
domestic applicants have shown an increasing trend, and Chinese 
patent applications have generally increased at a rapid pace every 
year since 1998.  Statistics also show that, China’s exports to 
Europe are conventionally restricted to low-tech labor intensive 
products, but recent years have evidenced a gradual increase in 
output of value-added products such as electronic and information 
equipment.222  As of 2005, almost twenty percent of China’s exports 
were classified as high-tech.223  All these trends imply that the 
process of China’s transfer from an IP consumer to IP producer has 
started. 
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Figure 3.1. China’s Patent Application (1998–2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources from State Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”), compiled by the 
author. 
 
3.3.4. Promoting Transformation of China from Perceived   
Infringer to Unfortunate Victim 
Under the current international IPR system, developing nations 
need sufficient incentives to bring their IPR enforcement systems in 
line with TRIPs standards.224  At the same time however, the 
recipient countries must be equipped with necessary scientific and 
technological capacities so that the local economies flourish.225  
This accumulation process is essential for a developing country to 
achieve the economic benefits of establishing IPR protections.226 
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In the case of China, a penetrating strategy entails promoting 
China’s further participation in the global economy and 
encouraging it to develop its own world class technologies.227  It is 
important to encourage an appreciation of the interests that IPR 
protection can give to Chinese innovators when certain 
development has been achieved.  This will require the 
establishment of a strong domestic constituency of innovators 
within China whose interests will suffer both in relation to their 
own ideas and in terms of access to foreign investment and 
technology transfer.228  Only if China continues to protect IPR by 
its self-sufficient enforcement system without being externally 
threatened may it be said that the West has found the right key to 
undoing the “Gordian Knot“ and obtaining vigorous enforcement. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The contemporary Chinese legal system was not inherited from 
its traditional legal system but was a result of China’s continuous 
legal reform notably commencing since the end of the 1970s.  Legal 
reform in China is an inevitable historical phenomenon and an 
important component in the process of its unprecedented 
industrialization and modernization.  However, countervailing 
traditional Chinese cultural traits still run deep in the national 
consciousness.  The enigmatic cultural landscape has shaped a 
unique model of Chinese philosophies that have undermined 
China’s attempts in upgrading its IPR enforcement mechanism, 
making the enforcement much more complex and time-consuming. 
The lack of transparency behind the enforcement mechanisms 
reflects China’s cultural uniqueness, institutional impediments, 
and economic insufficiency that are incompatible with IPR 
foundational requirements.  To a large extent, the IPR enforcement 
problems one may attribute to China’s unique. The reasons for the 
IPR enforcement problem in China are manifold and are 
interdependent.  It is however an interesting and demonstrable fact 
that the political transition, inter alia, is a decisive factor and 
therefore acts as a pivot.  The West is therefore advised to 
genuinely understand the multifaceted nature of China’s 
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enforcement mechanism.  Before China has gone through with its 
transition from “rule by law“ to “rule of law,” the objective of IPR 
enforcement in China should be achieved, to a large extent, via 
political communication, coordination and intervention, rather 
than a legal process. 
China has made arduous efforts towards gaining admittance 
into the international IPR community and has transplanted an 
elaborate IPR regime that has been proved to be “a castle in the 
air.”  It is not surprising that the existing IPR regime has not 
completely fit in indigenous social political environment and 
China still lacks potential motivations to fight IPR infringement 
effectively.  China’s formula for success in IPR enforcement stems, 
to a great extent, from the highly authoritarian system and its 
absorbed promotion of coherent institutional reform and rule of 
law.  However, to carry out such a reform in China’s conservative 
and bureaucratic colossus must be an enormous challenge.  
Without help, it is unlikely that China will be able to make the 
appropriate adjustments necessary and build the institutional basis 
for steady economic development.  The West is advised to be 
patient and supportive during China’s gradual transitional period.  
This is a learning curve for which there is no panacea.  Any 
attempt for quick success and instant benefit may result in giving 
up halfway. 
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